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Abstract

While elliptic curve cryptography and quantum cryptography are significantly different branches
of cryptography, they provide a suitable reference point for comparison of the value of
developing methods used in the present and investing in methods to be used in the future. Elliptic
curve cryptography is quite common today, as it is generally secure and efficient. However, as
the field of cryptography advances, the value of quantum cryptography’s inherent security from
its basic properties should be considered, as a fully realized quantum cryptosystem has the
potential to be quite powerful. Ultimately, it is of critical importance to determine the value of
investing in strengthening current cryptosystems in comparison to seeking to accelerate the
development of new ones. While both are of importance, the question should be asked if one
avenue of development will be more effective overall.
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A Comparison of Cryptographic Methods
Cryptography refers to the practice of encrypting, sending, and decrypting information in
order to protect that information from any enemies that would wish to know and exploit it. It is
commonly employed by any technological system that needs to keep some amount of
information private, be it personal user data on the internet or government secrets that cannot fall
into enemy hands. Regardless of why it may be employed, cryptography is an important practice
for any entity in an increasingly digital age, where new methods to protect and attack
information systems are constantly in development.
For this discussion of cryptography, an appropriate place to begin would be with a
definition of terms. Plaintext is used to describe the information that needs to be encrypted,
transmitted, and decrypted; it is the information that the two communicating parties wish to share
privately. Ciphertext refers to how the information reads as it is sent. Ciphertext is a string of
symbols or characters, usually numbers, representing the plaintext in some way, which needs to
be deduced through the methods used for encryption and decryption, depending on the processes
used. Plaintext is converted to ciphertext through use of a key. While some cryptographic
systems employ multiple keys, every system uses at least one key that is kept private, known
only to the two communicating parties. The task of the attacker is to acquire the ciphertext and
the key without being detected by the two communicating parties, and decrypt the plaintext.
When discussing the scenario of two parties seeking to exchange information, with an outside
party seeking to intercept that information, this paper will conform to the standard practice of
designating the party sending the information as Alice, the intended recipient as Bob, and the
party attempting to eavesdrop as Eve.
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In a standard cryptographic procedure, Alice seeks to send some amount of sensitive
information to Bob. They have a channel through which to communicate, but the potential for
Eve to access that channel also exists. Alice must therefore take her plaintext and convert it into
ciphertext, based on the methods being used in that particular situation. The strategies employed
will detail the particulars of the key, how the ciphertext is sent to Bob, and how he can receive
the key he needs to decrypt the ciphertext. If Eve is unable to acquire both the ciphertext and the
key, then the communication will have been successful. Many strategies will also have
countermeasures present to make this more challenging for Eve than if she simply needed to
break the base form of the cryptographic strategy.
Cryptography began with more simple methods, such as the scytale, a simple device
comprised of a wooden cylinder and a strip of a material such as leather. Early ciphers did not
employ much more than simple transposition of letters to hide the messages being sent. As the
need for more sophisticated methods arose, new methods and systems have been developed
throughout history to continue to protect important information from enemies (Bruss et al.,
2007). Now the field has advanced to a point of integrating far more complex mathematical
processes in order to keep up with humanity’s advancements in mathematics and computation.
As the abilities of outside parties to crack codes and algorithms grows more advanced, so too
must the sophistication of the codes and algorithms employed increase.
As there are a variety of cryptographic methods currently in use, this thesis will use
elliptic curve cryptography as a representative of present methods. While there are many others
that could be used for this comparison, elliptic curve cryptography is one of the most widely
used and is considered to be one of the more effective strategies currently employed. This will be
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compared to quantum cryptography, a method that while still in development has already shown
that it will be incredibly effective, as the transmission of data through particles such as photons
makes it usually impossible for an interloper to even read the data being sent without alerting the
two communicating parties.
As advancements are made in cryptography, the methods employed must be improved
upon or replaced. Developments in quantum computing will eventually lead to more widespread
use of quantum systems in cryptography, and will render older methods obsolete. However, the
development of quantum cryptography is not yet at a point where such widespread use is
feasible. As this is the case, there must be a discussion of the relationship between improvement
of past methods and development of new ones. While both must certainly take place, it must be
asked whether one is a priority. This question is the intention of this thesis.
This comparison is not being made in the sense of pitting two contemporaries against one
another to determine a more effective strategies. Instead, this comparison appeals to the
prioritization of general development. As time goes on, humans will always continue to
experiment and learn in a variety of fields. As new information is discovered and learned, it is
implemented as the relevant technology allows. When that development leads to new
technologies, the cycle continues, and the potential for further complexity, in this case in the
field of cryptography, continues to grow. However, research and development does require an
allocation of resources, be they people, technological assets, or others. The purpose, then, of this
comparison, is to determine whether, for any arbitrary scenario, with whatever resources may be
available to the parties involved, priority should be given to the fortification of old strategies or
the development of new ones. Both will inevitably occur, and both should; to utterly neglect
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either option would be foolish, especially when dealing with cryptography, as it opens the door
for extreme vulnerability in the near future or distant future, depending on the area of neglect.
The question must be asked, however, whether it is worth it to risk being left behind, so to speak,
in the area of quantum cryptography, or to risk an increased vulnerability in present-day
strategies.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
In order to discuss elliptic curve cryptography, an understanding of how elliptic curves
function is necessary. To do so, definitions of abelian groups and finite fields is necessary, as
elliptic curves are defined within those fields.
Abelian Groups and Finite Fields
Consider a set of numbers G. An abelian group involves a set of numbers, as well as
some binary operation, meaning an operation that maps the set 𝐺 × 𝐺 into 𝐺. A symbol such as *
can be used to represent the operation, although any symbol and corresponding operation may be
used, so long as they are adequately defined. An abelian group is expressed as (𝐺, ∗), and all of
its elements must conform to four conditions:
1.

Associativity; for any elements 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑎 ∗ (𝑏 ∗ 𝑐) = (𝑎 ∗ 𝑏) ∗ 𝑐.

2. Identity: there must exist an identity element in 𝐺. This element, referred to here as 𝑒,
must satisfy the condition that 𝑎 ∗ 𝑒 = 𝑒 ∗ 𝑎 = 𝑎 for any element 𝑎 ∈ 𝐺.
3. Inverses: every element 𝑎 ∈ 𝐺 must have an inverse in 𝐺, notated here as 𝑎−1 , such
that 𝑎 ∗ 𝑎−1 = 𝑎−1 ∗ 𝑎 = 𝑒, the identity element defined above.
4. Commutativity: for all elements 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐺, 𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 = 𝑏 ∗ 𝑎.
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The definition of a field stems from the definition of an abelian group: a field consists of
a set of numbers, 𝐻, and two operations, usually described as addition and multiplication,
notated + and ∗ respectively (however, as previously, these principles can be applied to any two
operations so long as they are sufficiently defined). There are three conditions for a field:
1.

(𝐻, +) is an abelian group where 0 is the identity element. This is called the additive
identity.

2. (𝐻,∗) must be an abelian group with 1 as the identity element. This is called the
multiplicative identity.
3. The distributive property holds: for any elements 𝑓, 𝑔, ℎ ∈ 𝐻,
(𝑓 + 𝑔) ∗ ℎ = (𝑓 ∗ ℎ) + (𝑔 ∗ ℎ).
It should also be noted that if set H has a finite number of elements, then the field (𝐻, +,∗) is a
finite field (Dhanda et al., 2020).
Elliptic Curves
In general, an elliptic curve presents all the points in a finite field that satisfy the equation
𝑦 2 = 𝑥 3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏, where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are elements of that finite field. This curve also includes the
point at infinity, which serves as the identity element for the additive abelian group formed by
the points on the curve (Koblitz et al., 2000).
Elliptic Curves in Cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptography involves taking the elliptic curve defined over a finite field,
generally chosen based on one of three models, and encrypting information through a method of
mapping portions of the data to corresponding points on the curve. The first of these three
models, the Weierstrass model, has already been introduced: curves are selected based on the
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equation 𝑦 2 = 𝑥 3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏, which can be used to describe any elliptic curve defined over a
large prime field. The other two models are as follows:
1.

the Twisted Edwards Curve model, which uses the equation
𝑎𝑥 2 + 𝑦 2 = 1 + 𝑑𝑥 2 𝑦 2 , where 𝑎 and 𝑑 are elements of the field

2.

the Montgomery model, using the equation 𝐵𝑦 2 = 𝑥 3 + 𝐴𝑥 2 + 𝑥, where 𝐴 and 𝐵 are
elements of the field.

(Dhanda et al., 2020)
This process is usually considered secure because of the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP), which states: “given an elliptic curve 𝐸 defined over 𝐹𝑞 , a point 𝑃 ∈ 𝐸(𝐹𝑞 ) of order n,
and a point 𝑄 ∈ 𝐸(𝐹𝑞 ), determine the integer 𝑙, 0 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, such that 𝑄 = 𝑙𝑃, provided that
such an integer exists” (Koblitz et al., 2000, p. 179). In this definition, 𝐹𝑞 is the finite field over
which the elliptic curve is defined. This problem becomes more of a challenge for an enemy to
decode when the party designing the key chooses a sufficiently large prime number for 𝑛.
Additionally, as outlined by Scholl, the difficulty of the DLP can be further increased by
selecting a super-isolated elliptic curve. A curve is super-isolated if its isogeny class contains
only one isomorphism class. This results in curves that are more difficult to determine for an
attacker than usual, since the majority of prime fields do not contain them (2019, p. 386). The
difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem quickly and efficiently has generally resulted
in secure transmissions through an elliptic curve system.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a public-key system, meaning that it employs two keys,
one public and one private, for cryptographic practices. So long as the private key remains
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private, the public key can be released on any channel, and it will be useless to any attacker
lacking access to the private key (Bahramian & Hajirezai, 2020; Dhanda et al., 2020).
The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Process
The standard ECC process as outlined by Dhanda et al. is comprised of three algorithms,
each yielding an important piece of the process. The algorithms generate a key pair, carry out an
encryption process, and a decryption process. In these algorithms, all references to “addition”
and “multiplication” refer to the general operations; specifics will vary based on the field being
used in a particular instance of the cryptography.
For the generation of a key pair, the generator of a cyclic subgroup within the finite field
as well as an element of that subgroup are used to generate the public and private keys. The
public key is created by using the field’s “multiplication” operation on an element of the
subgroup and the subgroup itself. This of course means the challenge for an adversary is
determining which of the many subgroups and elements of those subgroups were used to
determine the public key. The private key is the element of that cyclic subgroup that was used.
The encryption algorithm requires the selection of the elliptic curve upon which the data
will be mapped. After converting the plaintext to points on the curve, the algorithm generates
ordered pairs as the ciphertext. The first coordinate in the pair is the result of “multiplying” a
different element of the same cyclic subgroup by that subgroup. The second coordinate results
from “adding” the value on the curve that was originally mapped to and the “product” of the
public key and the element of the cyclic subgroup used to determine the first coordinate.
The receiving party, Bob, must only carry out one step to decrypt the information
received. By “adding” the additive inverse of the “product” of the private key and the first
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coordinate to the second coordinate, he will be able to determine the initial value that was
mapped along the curve. From this, the information needing to be sent can be extracted, thus
resulting in a successful transmission (2020).
Applications and Additional Methods
Many methods of cryptography use elliptic curves as a component, while adding other
computations, ultimately increasing the security of the information to be passed. Additionally,
many uses for elliptic curve cryptography exist, both as ways to transmit information and as
ways to use the transmission techniques to accomplish other goals, such as verifying a user.
User Authentication
Kumari et al. (2019) presented a method of using ECC to verify that two users
communicating are in fact each other, rather than some other party. The system relies on a
private key generator, independent of Alice of Bob, and allows them to each receive partial keys
through an identification string. These partial keys require implementation into verification of
other conditions determined by the particulars of the current session, and these are used to
develop the full keys that Alice and Bob will use to communicate.
Scalar Multiplication
One method presented by Aljamaly and Ajeena (2021) uses elliptic scalar multiplication;
that is, the data is encrypted based on a scalar multiplication graph, which involves the adjacent
points of an elliptic curve being linked by scalar multiplication, resulting in a graph with
weighted edges that matrices of encrypted data can be further encrypted along. By integrating
matrices, the usual matrix benefits of carrying out operations on large quantities of data in less
time can be employed in cryptography.
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Isogenies of Elliptic Curves
Another method uses the fact that the set of points on an elliptic curve form an abelian
additive group to develop a method based on isogenies. An isogeny maps one set of elliptic
curve points to another, with the stipulation that the point at infinity for the first set maps to the
point at infinity for the second set. By using a secure third party to construct public and private
keys based on isogenies and identification strings, encrypted data can be transmitted securely
based on standard elliptic curve measures as well as the difficulty of determining an isogeny
based only on a single point mapping (Bahramian & Hajirezai, 2020).
Strengths
Elliptic curve cryptography is quite efficient, as the keys are usually smaller due to the
nature of the encryption scheme (Dhanda et al., 2020). Other systems often have to carry out
more calculations or choose larger primes as a starting point for encryption, but the complexity
of the elliptic curve is such that similar security thresholds can be reached with less effort.
Additionally, the aforementioned discrete logarithm problem makes it particularly challenging
for any attacker to crack the system in a reasonable amount of time.
Weaknesses
Elliptic curve cryptography is not without its weaknesses. The main challenge for
attackers of ECC is to solve the Discrete Logarithm problem efficiently. Ultimately, while there
are strategies to crack an elliptic curve encryption, they still take time to execute, and a
sufficiently complex elliptic curve system should be able to carry out its communication
objectives before it could reasonably be broken by an attacker’s computing power.

A COMPARISON OF METHODS

13

A Shor’s Algorithm Variant
One threat to the security of ECC is a variant of Shor’s algorithm designed specifically to
break elliptic curve systems. The more well-known Shor algorithm was developed in order to
quickly find prime factorizations of large integers, while the later algorithm introduced could be
modified by replacing multiplication with addition of points on the elliptic curve mod p (where p
is some prime number) (Bernstein & Lange, 2017). The “mod” here refers to the use of modular
arithmetic, where a number mod p is equal to its remainder when divided by that number (for
example, 7 ≡ 3 (𝑚𝑜𝑑4), since 3 is the remainder when 7 is divided by 4). This method will
become particularly effective as quantum computing continues to advance, and is even expected
to thoroughly break ECC as a branch of cryptography (Bennett et al., 1997; Bernstein & Lange,
2017). This will be discussed further in later sections of the paper.
Pollard ρ-Method
The Pollard ρ-method is quite popular for large factorizations, and, as with Shor’s
algorithm, can be modified to implement elliptic curve additions. While this method would still
be incredibly tedious on its own, it is possible to run multiple processors in parallel. Since more
attempts would be occurring simultaneously, the time needed to break the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem would decrease significantly for each processor used (Koblitz et al., 2000).
Other Approaches
These are but two of the ways attackers could attempt to break an elliptic curve
cryptosystem. Other strategies include using Weil pairings of elliptic curves, J. Silverman’s
“xedni calculus,” and a variant of the Tate pairing (Koblitz et al., 2000).
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The ability to exploit side channels of ECC also exists. These attacks are insignificant
when systems are sophisticated enough, but still warrant concern when that threshold has not
been met. Even then, simple countermeasures such as randomness or “dummy operations” can
render these attacks irrelevant (Dhanda et al., 2020, p. 468).
Quantum Cryptography
As quantum computing continues to develop, its applications to the field of cryptography
become more feasible. Quantum cryptography is a rather broad field, but its being rooted in the
properties of quantum data transmission are quite promising, as it suggests an ability to protect
data to a greater extent merely due to how it is transmitted.
Quantum Computing
In contemporary computing, data is stored in bits, and the more well-known binary
standard of using 0 and 1 to store all of the information is employed. Quantum computing uses
qubits (quantum bits), often small particles such as an atom or photon. The data is stored and
read in a similar manner to the way most systems currently look for 0s and 1s, although the
quantum system looks for one of two states of the qubit that correspond to that result. A common
example is whether a photon’s polarization is horizontal, corresponding to 0, or vertical,
corresponding to 1 (Bennett & DiVincenzo, 2000; Bruss et al., 2007).
Quantum computing is particularly noteworthy because it is expected to completely
outperform any previous system for computations. The power of systems currently in use pales
in comparison to the expected strength of quantum systems, and it is only a matter of time before
they are widely integrated. While it is expected that quantum computers will develop similarly to
the way standard computers have, requiring large amounts of space at first (Gheorghiu et al.,
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2018), there will come a time in which the quantum computer has surpassed the modern
computer in every conceivable way, as their potential strength is far greater.
Applications to Cryptography
While quantum computing requires further development before widespread use can be
effectively implemented, cryptosystems built within quantum methods will have added security
in that the nature of quantum computing prevents information interaction without altering that
information, thus alerting the two parties attempting to communicate when comparing the
correlations of the states of their qubits (Alléaume et al., 2014). By using atoms or light particles
to transmit data, which have spin and orientation respectively, any form of tampering can be
easily observed. This leads to what is known as the No Cloning Theorem, which simply states,
“In a quantum system, information cannot be copied or read by an eavesdropper” (Bruss et al.,
2007, p. 11; Kumar & Garhwal, 2021, p. 3831).
Many of the methods listed below take advantage of quantum entanglement, as they rely
on the use of entangled states. Quantum entanglement occurs when two particles have many of
their physical properties “tied” together, making it so that any action affecting the state of one
particle also affects the other, and their states cannot be read as individual particles. Many of the
most secure quantum cryptography methods use entangled states, and it can even be described as
“the heart of quantum cryptography” (Kumar and Garhwal, 2021, p. 3833).
Methods
Quantum cryptography has a variety of methods. The most well-known system is the
BB84 protocol, developed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984 (hence the name), but
a variety of other methods have also been developed. Some of these methods make use of
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quantum properties like entangled states, or other mathematical ideas like matrices or continuous
variables. One application even uses the properties of quantum cryptography to present a game
of chance between the two users with a verifiable winner, rather than relying on whether one
party is telling the truth (Bennett & Brassard, 2014).
An important note with quantum methods is that it can be difficult to distinguish
orientations associated with the qubits if the systems being used do not have significant
variation. Usually, Bob would use either the rectilinear basis, which considers horizontal and
vertical orientation, directions 0° and 90°, or the circular basis, with directions of 45° and 135°
(Kumar & Garhwal, 2021). While both bases may have a role to play in a particular method, an
individual qubit will only ever be measured according to one basis. This is because it would be
impossible to reliably distinguish, for example, a 45° orientation from a 90° orientation when
correctly and consistently interpreting the states of the qubits is essential for the cryptography
(Bennett & DiVincenzo, 2000).
The BB84 Protocol
The BB84 Protocol is a fairly straightforward process. The first party, Alice, sends a
qubit to the second party, Bob. For this example, consider the use of polarization of photons with
horizontal orientation corresponding to 0 and vertical orientation corresponding to 1. Alice can
communicate to Bob through other channels which basis for polarization is being used, and then
they can compare measurements to ensure the security of the quantum channel. If Alice sends a
test qubit with a horizontal polarization, but it does not reach Bob with that expected
polarization, it becomes clear that some form of eavesdropping has occurred, as the polarization
has been altered.
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This illustrates the core idea of the protocol, but actual practice implements multiple
qubits, and the bases by which they are measured are selected at random by Alice. Bob also
evaluates each bit by random bases, so approximately half of the bits sent will be evaluated in the
same manner by each of them. Both parties would then take half of the remaining bits and ensure
that the polarizations match; significant deviation would lead them to conclude the presence of
an eavesdropper, while significant agreement (allowing for some degree of error) would show
that the remaining private quarter of the original batch of qubits would be safe to use as a key
(Bruss et al., 2007; Kumar & Garhwal, 2021).
Other protocols exist that function similarly to the BB84 protocol with some alterations
to function. The BBM92 Protocol (Bennett, Brassard, Mermin, 1992) has both Alice and Bob
receive their photons from the same source, resulting in a stronger correlation in the absence of
an eavesdropper should they both use the same basis for measuring polarization. The B92
Protocol (Bennett, 1992) deviates from standard practice of all of the bases being orthogonal.
Instead, Alice would assign, at random, one of two non-orthogonal orientations to 0 and 1, and
send them to Bob. Since Bob would measure approximately half of the bits in each basis of
orthogonal orientations, he would have certainty for half of each set, which would still amount to
half of the total selection of bits received. The two parties could then compare and discard by the
same process as in BB84 (Kumar and Garhwal, 2021).
Entangled States
The Ekert 1991 protocol (E91) is the primary example of cryptography using entangled
states. The process entails that both parties receive one of two entangled photons, and that their
measurements will yield either perfect correlation or perfect anti-correlation in the absence of an
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eavesdropper. As with previous methods, Alice and Bob would reveal their measurements,
compare results, and be able to discard discrepancies and try again, being able to sacrifice test
measurements until a secure channel was established (Kumar and Garhwal, 2021).
Nagata, Diep, and Nakamura (2020) presented a method based on the E91 Protocol.
Alice selects a function along which the information is encrypted, and then applies a
transformation based on the function to a qubit to create an entangled state. With this
information, Bob is then able to extract the function by comparing the final and initial states.
Should there be any attempt to eavesdrop, the initial and final states will not match, and Alice
and Bob can simply try again with new states and a new function.
A similar protocol presented by Diep, Nagata, and Wong (2020), again based on the E91
protocol, uses entangled states with continuous variables. This strategy follows the same process
of selecting a function, generating an entangled state, and enabling Bob to determine the function
based on the states. The difference is in the implementation of continuous variables in the
entangled states, adding an extra layer of complexity to the encryption.
Other Methods
In addition to these methods, several others exist that take advantage of the properties of
quantum cryptography, although they are not as well-known. In some cases, there may be tradeoffs between using these methods compared to the more standard methods discussed previously.
The Six-State protocol is a generalization of the BB84 protocol, using six states facing
the positive and negative directions of the x-, y-, and z-axes of a Bloch Sphere (Kumar and
Garhwal, 2021). A Bloch sphere is a visualization of qubits as points on the surface of a sphere,
in which operations are represented as rotations of the sphere (Gheorghiu et al., 2018). This
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method can be more secure than BB84 in theory, but runs into implementation issues, as well as
requiring Bob to measure the orientation of his photons after Alice has revealed the bases over a
public channel, rather than before. Since this occurs after Bob has received his qubits, it requires
Eve to rely on guesswork to retransmit any intercepted qubits correctly to Bob, in which case
approximately 1/3 of Bob’s qubits would become incorrect.
The SARG04 Protocol requires that Alice emit two photons where one would be sent in
BB84, and the bases are never revealed. Two additional states would then be transmitted by
Alice with openly declared bases for measurement assigned to each. When these are sent, one
state will match Alice’s declaration, and the other has a 50% chance of not matching the
declaration, but the only way to know which is for this to occur, thus signaling to Bob that the
correct basis for measuring the original qubits is the one that matched (Kumar and Garhwal,
2021).
Nagata and Nakamura (2018) presented a system utilizing matrices. After outlining an
algorithm through which a string of integers can be evaluated with one query, they can use
measurement of a sufficiently large quantum state to determine multiple strings at once. In their
algorithm, each string is assigned to one column of a matrix, and the quantum state
accommodates each row. By combining queries through matrices and quantum cryptography
together, this algorithm is able to convey a large array of data with one request in a system.
Strengths
Quantum Cryptography’s primary strength comes from its security being rooted in the
method by which data is transmitted, rather than the mathematics used to encrypt said data. The
algorithms used in the transmission add further security to a process that is already somewhat
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difficult to eavesdrop on, rather than being the sole reason the data is protected. As discussed
previously, properties like the No Cloning Theorem show that Eve cannot even read the data
being transmitted without interfering with the qubits, thus alerting Alice and Bob.
Weaknesses
While the No Cloning Theorem makes it difficult for Eve to interfere with Quantum
communications, there are several strategies an attacker might employ to gain access to private
information.
Backflash Emissions
One potential threat to quantum systems is the possibility that Eve could learn
information by gleaning it from backflash emissions rather than the actual photons being sent.
Backflash emissions result when certain systems emit light after detecting a photon. The
information this emission could pick up has the potential to allow Eve to learn information about
the photons in the receiver without running the risk of tampering with the qubits themselves.
While a single backflash would not provide an eavesdropper with a comprehensive breakdown
of everything Bob would be receiving, it does present enough risk of information leakage to be a
concern, as the possibility does exist for Eve to potentially determine the key being used from
pieces of information in the backflash.
Some countermeasures for potential backflash attacks do exist. Firstly, the application of
a spectral filter to the receiver would significantly reduce the amount of backflash emissions.
Pinheiro et al. state that this reduction would be by a factor of 14. They also discuss a procedure
that Bob could carry out to reduce the ability of Eve to exploit the emissions by determining the
likelihood of a backflash emission, as well as the reverse transmission efficiency of the photon
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receiver, and then adjusting the algorithm and implementing privacy amplification procedures as
needed (Pinheiro et al., 2018).
Faked States
Another potential method through which one could eavesdrop on quantum
communications is Makarov and Hjelme’s faked states attack. While it would be quite difficult
for Eve to resend a quantum state without signs of tampering, an eavesdropper could employ a
strategy where they intercept the original state and send an entirely new one that Bob could
reasonably believe is the original. The new states sent by Eve would be the titular faked states.
For Eve to send these faked states, a tap would need to be inserted somewhere in the
system being used for communication. This task becomes more difficult if Eve does not have
access to copies of the technology being used by Alice and Bob, there is no opportunity to insert
the tap while the quantum channel is not in use, too much time passes before Alice and Bob
publicly discuss the states, and/or a continuous monitoring detector is present in Alice and Bob’s
communication system. Should Eve be successful, even despite any of these factors being
present, she would be able to access the entire key (or part of the key, should she be partially
successful).
Two main precautions can be taken to mitigate this attack. The first is the implementation
of a random number generator to set the number of bases to be detected. The concrete
inconsistency would make it more difficult for Eve to reliably sneak alternative qubits in without
alerting Alice and Bob. The second, alluded to previously, is the installation of a narrowband
filter and monitoring detectors, as they make it much more difficult for light to enter the system
from outside sources without being detected (Makarov & Hjelme, 2005).
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Timing Side Channels
Another risk that exists with quantum cryptography is the possibility that an eavesdropper
may use the time between detections of photons to learn information about the key, since the
detections need to be publicly announced for quantum protocols. However, the countermeasures
for this attack are fairly simple: The delays must be either standardized or randomized to ensure
that detecting abnormalities would be a simple process (Lamas-Linares & Kurtsiefer, 2007).
Other Threats
An assortment of other potential threats to quantum cryptography exist. Adequate
protective measures should be taken with regards to photon detectors. The backflash emissions
attack has been discussed previously, but they are also vulnerable to attacks based on wavelength
dependency, detector control, and efficiency mismatch. Additionally, the system at large could
be exploited should information be leaked through separate security concerns, such as a trojan
horse attack, or if the system were interfered with through laser seeding or laser damage
(Pinheiro et al., 2018).
Furthermore, while it is not necessarily a threat from a malicious party, quantum systems
do need to be designed bearing in mind that the surrounding environment could interfere with the
transmission of particles (Bennett and DiVincenzo, 2000). While a certain degree of tolerance is
technically permitted for effective quantum computation, the risk of unreliable data as a result of
measures not taken is one that must be considered when dealing with quantum systems.
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Variety of Techniques
Both Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Quantum Cryptography provide their users with a
wide variety of algorithms through which information can be transmitted. Quantum
Cryptography, being still in its earlier stages, has plenty of time for even more strategies to be
developed in addition to those currently devised. Elliptic Curve Cryptography, despite being an
older system by comparison, is still having strategies developed as recently as 2021 (Aljamaly &
Ajeena). Neither branch of cryptography is too restrictive of its users in terms of the options
available for employing their strategies; each has been significantly expanded and bears potential
for continued expansion as technological and mathematical understanding improves over time.
Viability
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is the only of the two systems that is consistently viable at a
large scale as of the writing of this paper. This is simply because Quantum Cryptography needs
more development and implementation to be readily available on such a scale. When this does
occur, however, Quantum Cryptography will clearly be the superior choice, as its security has a
certainty to it, given the reliance on physics for the protection of the information. Elliptic Curve
Cryptography, like its contemporaries, is quite strong, but ultimately relies on an eavesdropper
being unable to solve a mathematical problem(s) due to their difficulty. Difficulty is relative, and
even luck with regards to trial-and-error is a real factor. While a fortunate guess or an adversary
that finds a complex problem simple enough to solve efficiently (or has devised a way to do so
with technology) would be a rare occurrence, these are still possibilities that need to be
considered.
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Longevity
The fatal reality for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in a world that is approaching a more
widespread use of quantum computing is the fact that ECC in its entirety will be easily
compromised by quantum computation (Bernstein and Lange, 2017). Quantum cryptography
methods are able to defend against quantum attacks, but most pre-quantum methods cannot.
Those that can require reworks to do so, and at least have to raise their bare minimum
complexity, so they will not be as easy to use. Therefore, when the day does come that quantum
systems are in widespread use, any party that seeks secure communications will need to have
strong quantum cryptographic methods in place to ensure security. Any entity that fails to do so
would be completely vulnerable to any quantum-wielding attackers.
Conclusion
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a technique with many strengths. It is simple to use, with
the ability to add more complexity for further security, and it is difficult to crack even in its base
form. At this time, it does not present any algorithms that would be easy for an eavesdropper to
crack. While some algorithms have been devised that could in theory break an elliptic curve
system, the computational strength does not yet exist to apply those algorithms efficiently to a
sufficiently complex system, thus usually preserving any elliptic curve method long enough for
Alice and Bob to communicate all of the necessary information. Furthermore, the option will
always exist to switch between multiple encryptions, so as to increase the amount of time needed
for an enemy to crack the system. Frankly, as long as the Discrete Logarithm Problem persists as
a strong line of defense for a cryptosystem, ECC will continue to be a viable and effective means
of encrypted communication.
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Quantum Cryptography, on the other hand, is quite unique in its strengths. The method of
transmission implements physics in such a way that there is already significant security without
the need to apply any mathematics to the process. As algorithms are added to the process, the
security continues to be strengthened. While most quantum methods are in simple or theoretical
stages, in accordance with the present development of quantum computing, the more widespread
use of quantum systems in the future will make quantum cryptography a viable, even necessary
option for secure communications. Those weaknesses that do exist, even theoretically, all have
solutions and precautions devised to mitigate or eliminate the threat they pose. Additionally,
since quantum computing systems will need more development time before their widespread use
and the subsequent implementation of quantum cryptographic systems, there is also more time
for more or stronger countermeasures to be developed to known or even yet-to-be-discovered
threats.
Ultimately, a day will come when elliptic curve cryptography, alongside many other
contemporary methods, becomes totally eclipsed by quantum cryptography. Many of the present
weaknesses of elliptic curve cryptography will only become more of a liability as quantum
computing becomes more widespread. While the effective use of quantum cryptography methods
is not feasible at this time, it will provide a more secure system than has ever existed prior.
Ultimately, with all of the benefits of quantum cryptography, it is clear that the focus of research
and development in the field of cryptography should be significantly directed towards ensuring
the widespread use of quantum methods, both for the ability to have the most secure
communications and to be able to crack enemy encryptions with far greater efficiency.
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